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This paper examines Russian and American ideologies and their influence on the 
foreign policies of both countries in historical retrospective and today. The paper 
especially illustrates the role of ideology in Russia and U.S. relations during 
different periods with different intensity. In the relatively “calm” periods of 
history ideology was not that noticeable. However, at other times, Russia and the 
United States have engaged in a clash of ideologies that provided a powerful 
impulse to the formation of new models of international relations. Despite the 
post-Cold War hope that there would be less ideology in international relations in 





The current foreign policy of the Russian Federation, to a significant extent, is a 
historical legacy formed by tremendous calamities and immense triumphs. The 
Russian Empire played a major role in thwarting Napoleon’s relentless expansion. 
The Soviet Union subverted Germany’s advanced war machine during the Second 
World War and came to dominate the world scene just two decades later 
(Shevchenko, 2015). But during its more than 1,000-year history, Russia has had 
four catastrophic events which crushed it as a state: the 13th century Mongolian 
invasion, the 17th century “Time of Troubles” (Smuta), the Bolshevik Revolution 
of 1917 (after which Russia became a battlefield for civil war and foreign 
interventions), and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 (which was 
accompanied bу a series of civil wars in post-Soviet space, a catastrophic 
economic downturn, and the unprecedented geopolitical breakdown of the 
country). This collective history helps to explain key specifics of Russian 
idiosyncrasy–the sense of vulnerability, the very painful reaction to any foreign 
influence and foreign ideological “experiments,” and the struggle to preserve not 
only her territories and statehood itself, but her moral values also. 
The notion of “statehood” (derjavnost) has become very important in the 
contemporary political discourse within Russia. This is different from the notion 
of “state,” which mainly refers to administrative, managerial, law-enforcement, 
and judicial functions. The notions of derjava (power) and samoderjavie 
(autocracy) point to sovereignty, full self-sufficiency, independence, and the 
significance of the country in international relations. Furthermore–they connote 
the spiritual and moral mission of the Russian state–resisting evil in the world. 
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That is why the first Russian political ideology, which was formulated in 
1833 by the Secretary of Education Count Sergey Uvarov, included these notions. 
The so called Uvarov’s Triad– “Orthodoxy, Autocracy (samoderjavie) and 
Nationality”–also known as the Official Nationality–was a Russian national 
version of an international European ideology of restoration and reaction (Yanov, 
2013). Since 1833, and to the present time, this triad remains the best way to 
explain the specifics of Russian historic conservatism and its modern incarnation.  
In contrast with universal and international ideologies like socialism and 
liberalism, conservatism has always represented a national phenomenon. Like K. 
Leontiev, a 19th century philosopher, wrote, “each nation has its own protective 
ideology: the Turks have Turkish one, the Englishmen–English, Russians–
Russian; and liberalism is everyone’s” (Leontiev, 1885). While liberalism has not 
tended to find much expression within Russian identity, conservatism has. 
Each time when Russia lost “statehood,” it cost her people blood, suffering, 
misery, fear, and humiliation. The most fresh, and for several generations a still 
unhealed wound, was the first post-Cold War decade which resonates with defeat, 
the loss of identity, and subservience to the West. Russians throughout society 
were inclined to blame the “de-ideologization” of Yeltsin’s failed policies for all 
of their disasters.  
 
The Importance of Ideology to Guiding Social Action 
 
Today most Russian specialists in political science (including the author of this 
essay) would probably characterize themselves as “inertial Marxists” (Bogaturov, 
Kosolapov, & Chrustalev, 2002; Manykin, 2009; Pechatnov & Manykin, 2012, 
Setov, 2010). To apply this term to the theory of international relations, most 
Russian scholars share the views of the realist paradigm which has a lot in 
common with Marxism (material interests are basic, ideas are “superstructure” 
etc.). It is interesting to note that this statement applies not only to specialists who 
received their education in Soviet times, but also to the younger generation of 
Russian scholars who embrace this theoretical position. The liberal or 
constructivist approaches have not yet taken strong roots in the current Russian 
academic community. The classical definition of ideology given by the French 
philosopher of 18-19th century Antoine Destutt de Tracy as “a science of ideas” 
(Kennedy, 1979) seems to be too broad for contemporary challenges of scientific 
analysis. In this circumstance, Russian scholars tend to include Marxist precepts 
as an element of their methodology of the study of ideology.  
The key Marxist position about ideology (expressed in his famous German 
Ideology in 1846) is that it is just a “reflection” of socio-political reality: “. . . The 
production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness is at first directly 
interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the 
language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear 
at this stage as the direct efflux of their material behavior . . .” (Marx 2000, p. 8). 
Nevertheless, we also cannot miss another famous Marx thought, expressed in 
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1844: “Ideas become a material force when [in the] possession of the masses” 
(Marx, 2000, para7). 
Why is ideology so important? In contrast with philosophy that seeks to explain 
the universe, but does not offer concrete actions, the main function of ideology is 
to provide human beings with guidance for social actions. Ideology supplies 
motivation for the long-term purposes of political behavior and the methods of 
gaining them - as Russian eminent specialists in international relations theory point 
out (Кosolapov, 2002, pp.234-235; Voytolovsky, 2015). However, not all ideas can 
become so influential. In order to become influential, they must resonate with and 
address the aspirations of the masses. This “connection” best occurs in very 
particular circumstances and conditions of human life. Such a situation can be 
illustrated by examples of U.S.-Russian relations in the 18th and 19th centuries.  
 
Ideology in Russia and United States Relations  
in the 18th and 19th Centuries 
 
Ideology became a significant element of international relations at the end of the 
18th century. The turning point was the French Revolution and the wars of 
Napoleon. This statement is generally accepted in both Russian and Western 
literature. However, by accepting this point we risk overlooking a very important 
fact: the birth of the United States as a new country in the Western hemisphere. 
Appearing as a first “practical” result of the Enlightenment, this new state carried a 
powerful ideological charge - and well before the French Revolution, it challenged 
the European “ancient regime.” 
Alan Cassels (1996) in Ideology and International Relations in the Modern 
World writes, “Behind the revolt of the thirteen American colonies in 1776 lay 
political theories regarding a ruler’s obligation under a social contract and the 
iniquity of absolute monarchy or despotism” (p. 15). The phrase “we the people of 
the United States …” officially confirmed the principle of popular sovereignty two 
years before it was included in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
of the Citizen. This could not have been to the liking of Catherine the Great. Thus, 
the ideology of the United States of America a priori had the potential for conflict 
with Russian autocracy. However, conflict did not develop. Just the opposite 
occurred: Catherine the Great in fact chose to help American patriots in their fight 
with Britain, first refusing to honor the request of British King George III to send 
Russian troops for the suppression of the uprising colonies, and later initiating the 
League of Armed Neutrality (1780-1783) to protect trade between neutral states 
and the countries which were involved in the war.  
The Russian Empress, being an adherent of the traditional 18th century 
European balance of power policy, tried to weaken Britain. There were also 
ideological considerations. For example, several years later Russia, while actively 
trading with the young American Republic, was steadily waging war with 
revolutionary France. The explanation for this perhaps puzzling choice is that 
Catherine the Great did not take American free-thinking and sedition as a serious 
practical threat to the Russian regime. Moreover, the reason is not only the 
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distance involved–the American revolutionary contagion, of course, was much 
further away than the French Revolution. The American Revolution also did not 
look that bloody and radical. In comparison with the French “Peace to the shacks! 
War on the palaces!” the American “Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” 
seemed pretty harmless. The concept “pursuit of happiness,” upon closer 
examination, turned out to be much closer to the John Locke's triad of “life, 
liberty, and property” than to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s conception of property, 
which became even more radicalized by the French Revolution. The personality of 
the Empress also mattered: Catherine the Great was known for her fascination 
with the philosophy of the Enlightenment, which she skillfully used to disguise 
the most unsightly features of Russian autocracy, and for improving the image of 
the throne.  
Meanwhile, the former colonies had to decide how to deal with the rest of the 
world. The founding fathers encountered a serious dilemma. Should the young 
republic concentrate its efforts on creating a “City upon a Hill” which would be a 
superior model and a lighthouse for humankind? Alternatively, should the country 
share its unique experience with the Old World? In many ways, making the first 
choice implied isolation and not adopting the idea of a noble mission, whereas 
making the second choice would be to step into the morass of involvement in 
eternal European wars and conflicts.  
In 1796 in the famous Farewell Address, President George Washington laid 
out the route for future America foreign policy: “The great rule of conduct for us 
in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with 
them as little political connection as possible. So far as we have already formed 
engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop. 
Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none or a very remote 
relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of 
which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence therefore it must be unwise 
in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her 
politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities” 
(Washington, 1796, para 38.). Thus, the decision was made to reduce involvement 
in any conflicts outside the American continent. This reduced the risks for 
Catherine the Great and her successors, who already had too much engagement in 
Europe.  
The French Revolution was also a revolution in international relations. Before 
the revolution all European states were monarchies, so any diversity of concepts 
could not exist in principle. Afterwards, it was very different. The Jacobins 
revolutionary wars and later the Napoleonic military campaigns, in fact 
represented a struggle for a new “social project,” the spread of new liberal values 
and ideals. This circumstance demanded adequate countermeasures from the 
European autocracies. The military victories over Napoleon were not enough–
powerful liberal ideas could not be stopped just by military methods.  
Russian Tsar Alexander I articulated the fundamental principle of the new 
international system through the Holy Alliance of European monarchs which was 
created on September 26, 1815, with the purpose of preserving the social order. In 
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1820, Alexander I invited the countries - participants of the European “concert”– 
to sign a protocol that proclaimed the right to suppress revolutionary unrest in any 
country even without agreement of its government. Austria and Prussia 
consolidated their position with that of Russia. France and Great Britain refused to 
join.  
At the beginning of the 19th century, the ties of Russia and the United States 
began to strengthen. The common interest was the protection of the rights of 
neutral shipping and active trade during blazing European wars (Bolkchovitinov, 
1966, p. 336). There was mostly no place for ideology in U.S.-Russian relations 
throughout the 19th century. America was not even a part of an international 
system of that time while Russia was a member of “The Great Powers' Club,” one 
of the most significant actors of the multi-polar and mainly Euro-centric world. 
Ideologically, Russia remained a bulwark of autocracy and conservatism. 
Sometimes considerations of ideological solidarity even prevailed over Russian 
national interests; for instance, in 1848-1849 Tsar Nicolas I helped Emperor Franz 
Joseph to suppress the Hungarian rebellion.  
In general the Vienna model of international relations as well as the previous 
one, the Westphalian model, was based on the principle of national sovereignty, 
which did not require any country to have a particular type of governance or social 
order. European states mainly acted according to these models. In Russian-
American relations, this was manifested very brightly with the outbreak of the 
American Civil War. The autumn of 1862 marked a most dramatic point of 
cooperation between Russia and the United States. In a critical time for the Union, 
Russian Emperor Alexander II made a very risky decision–he ordered two 
squadrons of the Russian Navy to sail to the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the 
United States. Neither Russian nor American historians have reached a consensus 
on the motivations behind the dispatch of the Russian fleets to both the Atlantic 
and Pacific Coasts of the United States (Bolkchovitinov, 1996; Saul, 1991, p. 339-
354). The story was not as romantic as it may appear after reading enthusiastic 
reviews of American federal newspapers of the time. Helping President Lincoln 
and the cause of the North was not the first priority for Alexander II. The decision 
to dispatch the fleet came in the midst of a very tense time in the relations between 
Russian and European countries, primarily Britain and France. In January 1863, 
an uprising of national liberation began in the territory of “Russian Poland” (the 
territory Russia got after the Third partition of Poland in 1795 and Vienna 
Congress in 1815). After Russian troops started to suppress the rebellion, Britain 
and France presented to the Russian government a series of diplomatic notes 
demanding independence for Poland. Britain and France also demanded the 
convening of a European conference on the Polish question in order to discuss the 
future structure of the Polish state. Russia was just recovering from the Crimean 
War and a threat of a new European anti-Russian coalition was very serious. 
Emperor Alexander II declined to agree to the demands of the powers. He ordered 
Prince Gorchakov to answer with a firm “no” and protest against interference in 
the internal affairs of Russia. At the same time St. Petersburg did not want a new 
war. The difficulty of the situation in Russia was exacerbated by the fact that the 
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Russian fleet was much weaker than the united Anglo-French naval forces. In the 
event of war, Russia was vulnerable to the maritime operations of the European 
allies. In addition, there was a high probability that the Russian fleet would be 
blockaded inside the Baltic Sea. In this situation, the manager of the Marine 
Department, Admiral N. K. Krabbe, offered an exit - sending the fleet out of 
harm’s way as a preventive measure.  
The second intention at the time was to threaten to disrupt British sea trade. 
Russia's plan was implemented, and the calculation was accurate: the anti-Russian 
coalition completely collapsed. There is every reason to believe that the results of 
the visit of Russian naval squadrons to the United States exceeded the initial 
calculations and expectations of the naval ministry. Russia was able to solve the 
complex problems of both a political and a military-strategic nature. The mere 
presence of Russian warships in the U.S. ports forced England and France to 
abandon their intentions to intervene in the Polish question, helped to change the 
situation in the U.S. Civil War in favor of the North by siding with the Lincoln 
government, and demonstrated that the Russian fleet had once again become an 
effective force in international politics (Bolkchovitinov, 1994). At the same time it 
is important to highlight that Alexander II did not hesitate about which side of the 
American Civil War to support. The endorsement of the government of Abraham 
Lincoln was based on principles of sovereignty and legitimacy. Commenting on 
British-French intrigues and their plans for intervention against the Lincoln 
government, Russian Secretary of Foreign Affairs Prince Alexandre Gorchakov 
wrote to his American colleagues,  
 
“You know the sentiments of Russia. We desire above all things the 
maintenance of the American Union as one indivisible nation. . . . 
Proposals will be made to Russia to join some plan of interference. She 
will refuse any intervention of the kind. . . . You may rely upon it, she 
will not change. But we entreat you to settle the difficulty. I cannot 
express to you how profound an anxiety we feel — how serious are our 
fears” (Taylor, 1862, p.764).  
  
For Russians a dilemma about whom to support in this war did not exist. For 
the British it definitely did. Both conflicting American parties proclaimed ideas 
that mattered for the British liberal conscience. The Confederacy claimed the right 
of self-determination–the same as German, Italian, and other liberals had 
advanced in 1848. At the same time, Southerners in the United States also 
advocated for the institution of slavery, which was incompatible with liberal 
values. William E. Gladstone personified this liberal dilemma. Early in the war he 
was decidedly sympathetic to the Southern right of self-determination. It was at 
the worst time for the North–in the fall of 1862–that the British and French were 
planning intervention against Lincoln (Jones, 2011; Tarpley, 2011). Sending fleets 
to the American coasts was a signal to the British and French that the United 
States would not stay without allies if European powers make a decision to 
intervene in support of the “Southern insurgency”. Perhaps this partly led to the 
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fact that “by the close of 1865 Gladstone had been converted . . . to regard slavery 
as the key moral issue at stake and to switch his allegiance to the Union cause” 
(Cassels, 1996, p. 68). The contrasting positions of Russian solidarity and British 
equivocation could not be more clear. By the time Gladstone came to support the 
Lincoln government the Civil War was reaching its conclusion.  
In the 19th century, ideology was not a primary factor in international 
relations. The situation radically changed in the 20th century when the struggle for 
the minds of people became a constant part of world politics. That is why the 20th 
century has been called the “century of ideology.” Different periods of this 
century were marked with uncompromising conflict between various ideologies. 
Each of them (whether the liberal-democratic internationalism of Woodrow 
Wilson, or the Bolshevik project of world revolution, or Nazism, or the Soviet 
version of Marxism-Leninism) not only proposed new types of social systems 
inside the countries which they represented, but sought to establish a New World 
Order based on their particular ideology. The wars of the 20th century were wars 
for “new social projects.”  
 
Communist Internationalism vs. Liberal Internationalism 
 
The first “phase” of the U.S.-Russian ideological contest in the 20th century 
started during World War I. Before the war, the idea of “Manifest Destiny” was 
limited within the Western Hemisphere. During the war, the United States broke 
free from the clutches of isolationism. For the first time in history, the United 
States tried to project a global dimension. Woodrow Wilson, the 28th president of 
the United States, eventually tried to realize Thomas Paine’s (1776) vision that “a 
cause of America is in a great measure the cause of all mankind,” written in the 
introduction of his famous Common Sense (p.68). By the beginning of the war, the 
United States had become an economic giant, but primarily remained a minor 
player in global politics. 
Relying on the growing power of his state, while preparing the United States 
to go to war, President Wilson, who was perceived in Europe as an idealist, 
formulated a new American approach to international relations: “We insist upon 
security in prosecuting our self-chosen lines of national development. We do more 
than that. We demand it also for others. We do not confine our enthusiasm for 
individual liberty and free national development to the incidents and movements 
of affairs which affect only ourselves. We feel it wherever there are people that try 
to walk in these difficult paths of independence and right. . . . In this we are not 
partisans but heralds and prophets of a new age” (Wilson, 1915, para 10).  
For Europeans the most striking idea was that the American goals in war were 
formulated not as much in the national interest but to make “the world safe for 
Democracy” (Wilson, 1917, para 18). A stunning result was that the nation 
accepted this idea. However, having said that in April of 1917, the president could 
not have foretold that six months later his revolutionary approach would meet a 
not less powerful ideological competitor on the other side of the globe. In 
November of 1917, Russia offered the world another social project: the new 
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Soviet leadership declared its intention to spread the Bolshevik Revolution beyond 
the borders of Russia.  
It is well known that President Wilson’s Fourteen Points allowed Germany’s 
new chancellor, Prince Maximilian, to end the war on dignified terms and to reach 
an armistice without admitting defeat. This American plan also became the basis 
of the Versailles peace settlement. But it is not widely known that Wilson’s 
Fourteen Points actually were an answer to Lenin’s most thundering 
proclamation–the Decree on Peace: “The workers' and peasants' government, 
created by the Revolution of October 24-25 and basing itself on the Soviet of 
Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, calls upon all the belligerent peoples 
and their government to start immediate negotiations for a just, democratic peace” 
(Lenin, 1917, para 1). This was the appeal of the new Russian leader to the entire 
world. This looked like the Bolsheviks, whom Wilson deeply despised, had seized 
the initiative from the country that had just declared itself the leader of the liberal 
world. Paradoxically, Lenin and Wilson were campaigning for the same goals–
democratic peace, open diplomacy, national self-determination–but the ways of 
achieving them were totally antithetical.  
The American vision, based on the principles of a liberal-democratic 
interventionism, was presented in Wilson’s style–grandiloquently and in the 
abstract:  
 
What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves. 
It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it 
be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes 
to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice 
and fair dealing by the other peoples of the world as against force and 
selfish aggression. All the peoples of the world are in effect partners in 
this interest, and for our own part we see very clearly that unless justice 
be done to others it will not be done to us. (Wilson, 1918, para 2.)  
 
Lenin’s goal was much more concrete: “The workers' movement will triumph and 
will pave the way to peace and socialism” (Lenin, 1917). Both nations proclaimed 
a crusade. This ideological standoff predetermined not only the character of the 
bilateral relations, but also the nature of two international models–the Versailles-
Washington and the Yalta-Potsdam (or bipolar) models. 
Within a short period of postwar “Wilsonianism” (before America returned to 
isolationism) the United States managed to realize in practice a crusade of ideas. 
Notwithstanding the negative position of the War Department, Wilson responded 
to the request of France and Great Britain and sent American troops to Russia. 
The American Expeditionary Force was under the command of Major General 
William S. Graves. It was called Siberia, and consisted of 7,950 officers and 
enlisted men. Despite its stay in the Russian Far East from August of 1918 until 
April of 1920, the Siberia force did not take part in any battles, but the 
involvement of the United States in the Russian Civil War is an indisputable 
historical fact (McMaster, 2014).  
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Collective security, President Wilson’s most cherished concept that found 
embodiment in the League of Nations, became the foundation of the new Versailles-
Washington world order. From the moment of its creation, the Treaty of Versailles 
was doomed. The Senate of the United States never ratified it. Its distinct anti-
German and anti-Soviet character - Soviet Russia was not invited to the Paris 
Conference; and Germany was declared the main and only culprit of the war (Peace 
Treaty of Versailles, 1919) - led humankind to World War II.  
The specificity of this conflict for the first time since the end of the 18th 
century consisted of ideology in addition to the more traditional complex of 
factors (geopolitical, economic, etc.). The Axis powers fought not only for 
territories and resources–they strived also to impose on the world a certain manner 
of life and a distinct system of values.  
There were a variety of reasons why most major Western democracies and 
the Soviet Union became allies in this war. First, of course, they united in their 
efforts to stop the attempts of the Nazi revisionist powers to establish world 
dominance. But there was also an ideological factor: communist internationalism 
with its preaching of the equality of working people all over the world had the 
same humane charge as the liberal system of values–freedom and equality 
dovetailed with it better than with the misanthropic racism of Nazi Germany and 
Japanese militarism. 
 
The Cold War Paradox 
 
Following the defeat of Germany and of fascist ideology the world entered into a 
new epoch–so called “bipolarity.” On one hand, the Cold War seemed to represent 
the quintessential and most complete form of the U.S.-Russian ideological 
conflict. The military power and “soft” power of both states were called upon to 
serve the spread of moral values, the world-views, and the legitimacy of the two 
“superpowers.” In the big picture this represented a rivalry between two social 
systems and alternative ways of life–capitalism and socialism. The ideological 
component of international relations was acknowledged even by the pillars of 
realistic theory. Hans Morgenthau, by way of example, argued that “. . . the 
struggle for the minds of men” needed to be added to “the traditional dimensions 
of diplomacy and war” (Morgenthau, 1966, Preface).  
 There has been no period in the history of international relations when such 
number of ideological conceptions, doctrines, and theories were invented From 
George F. Kennan’s “containment” to Ronald Reagan’s “evil empire,” from the 
proclamation of Marxist-Leninist ideology with the reference to the old 
Bolsheviks’ principles of proletariat internationalism to Mikhail Gorbachev’s new 
political thinking with its priority of universal values over class, national, religion, 
etc.–all this diversity fitted into 45 years of the bipolar confrontation. 
On the other hand, in the worst period of bilateral relations–the Cold War - 
ideological disputes were not that meaningful. During the almost half century of 
bipolar confrontation each of the two countries tried to stick to rational approaches 
to bilateral relations. It meant balancing interests with values and avoiding 
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extremes. Of course there were periods when the ideological messages in the 
rhetoric of both countries dominated. For instance, during the Eisenhower years, 
United States foreign policy seemed to be highly ideological. But in practice the 
famous John Foster Dulles concept of “immorality and short-sightedness of 
neutrality” - countries had to take sides in the ideological struggle because 
neutrality was not a moral option - had to be implemented in concert with the 
geopolitical and geostrategic interests and intensified American involvements in 
Third World countries with the purpose to change uncomfortable regimes or vice 
versa–to support “the right” ones (Dulles, 1956). By way of example, cooperation 
between the United States and the most odious Latin American dictatorships 
continued throughout the Cold War. While the priority task of Soviet foreign 
policy in the Third World remained the support of “friendly regimes,” the decisive 
criterion for making decisions to grant aid (military, economic, technical) was the 
amount of practical and geostrategic benefit that the U.S.S.R. could obtain.  
It is also hard to say whose foreign policy was more ideological–the 
American or the Soviet. Shortly after World War II, despite the flows of 
ideological rhetoric, Josef Stalin approached foreign policy from the point of view 
of balance of power. For him, Eastern Europe belonged to the Soviet sphere of 
influence. Ideology was not his priority. Even if at the beginning of his 
revolutionary activity he shared the belief that working masses in their hearts are 
internationalists, the Polish-Soviet war of 1920 convinced him otherwise. The 
Polish proletariat and peasants did not support Lenin’s idea of overthrowing the 
bourgeois government and the “sovietization” of Poland. Stalin built his foreign 
policy on the principles of raison d’état and political realism. He did not support 
Greek communists, in fact leaving Greece for the Western sphere of influence. 
After 1947-48, when early post-war hopes that communist parties in Europe 
would strengthen their positions disappeared, Stalin started to enhance the 
“security belt” along western borders of the U.S.S.R., increasing the pressure on 
Eastern European governments. One of the measures to get their loyalty was 
“sovietization.” However, the determining factor of this politics was, of course, 
the presence of the Red Army. Stalin’s successors mostly continued this policy. 
For instance, Nikita Khrushchev rhetorically supported China’s claims to the 
islands of Taiwan but rejected any military action. Sometimes ideological rhetoric 
practically disappeared from the dialogue of both countries. This occurred when 
the opportunities for mutually beneficial partnership overpowered ideology–like 
in the first half of 1970s, during the détente era. Leonid Brezhnev, in spite of 
widespread opinion, did not give real assistance to the government of Salvadore 
Allende in Chile because he did not want to overly upset détente with the United 
States. A little detail can illustrate the Soviet approach: the cost to the Chilean 
government for leasing its Moscow Embassy was actually increased. Brezhnev 
too cherished the détente to expose it to risk for the sake of supporting the 
socialist experiments of the government of a distant Latin American country 
(Glazunova, 2017).  
Generally, the Americans accepted these rules and played mostly the same 
game: not to challenge the vital interests of the other. Thus, American reactions to 
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events in Hungary in 1956 and during the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact Invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in 1968 were not more than diplomatic protests and verbal 
condemnations. The same was true for the Soviet reaction to the American 
invasion of Grenada in 1983. Only once were the rules of this game roughly 
violated–in the fall of 1962. The Cuban Missile Crisis could have resulted in a 
nuclear catastrophe, but at the same time it paved the way for the future détente.  
The ideological aspect of the Cold War was more noticeable in the 
superpowers competition over the Third World. The term itself had very deep 
ideological connotations: in 1952 French sociologist Alfred Sauvy used it to refer 
to the former colonial countries, comparing them with the third estate of French 
society on the eve of the 18th century revolution - unfairly exploited and 
potentially revolutionary (Sauvy, 1952). As Odd A. Westad (2007), one of the 
founders of the “new Cold War history concept,” wrote, that it also assumed “the 
refusal to be ruled by the superpowers and their ideologies, the search for 
alternatives both to capitalism and Communism . . .” (p.2). But this alternative 
was difficult to achieve. The Third World became an arena of ideological and 
geopolitical competition. During almost five decades of “Cold War” American 
administrations–Republican and Democratic - both “officially took the view that 
adherence to Marxism-Leninism not only made governments internally repressive 
but also–through their presumed subservience to Moscow–a threat to the global 
balance of power” (Gaddis, 1992, p. 13). John Gaddis (1992) argues “there was 
never very good evidence to support this claim” (p. 13).  
The U.S.S.R. did try to use ideology to gain its objectives in so called 
“developing countries” of Asia and Africa. Both Moscow and Washington experts 
identified these areas as containing “vital” interests - security, strategic, economic, 
and political. Both the United States and the Soviet Union aspired to be a global 
power, with influence and presence across the globe as benefits a superpower. As 
former Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko used to say: there is no question 
of significance that can be resolved without the Soviet Union (Saivetz, 1989, p. 
211). Furthermore, the Third World served as a testing ground for both sides for 
their competing ideas about the nature and direction of historical changes. 
The fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union marked a new 
historical crossroads of international relations and the beginning of a new era. In 
comparison with the Cold War’s “clarity,” the post-war transitional phase seems 
to be much more muddled, dangerous, and unpredictable. To a large extent, this 
complexity can be explained with the growing role of the ideological factor in 
world politics. The present main confrontation between liberal ideas of a universal 
world and increasingly conservative antiglobalistic tendencies give a powerful 
impetus to the process of formation of a new international model. It is clear that 
U.S.-Russian relations in the present continue to be a testing ground for any global 
system.  
Present U.S.-Russian relations are surviving hard times. European and 
American media blame Russia. Putin’s Russia is called revisionist, aggressive, 
nationalistic, authoritarian, etc. Experts (mostly Western, but a few Russian also), 
trying to understand the overwhelming support and popularity of President 
59      Elena Glazunova 
 
 
Vladimir Putin in Russian society, sometimes make conclusions having nothing to 
do with reality. For example, in 2015 Senior Associate and Chair of the Carnegie 
Moscow Center A. Kolesnikov published an article titled “Russian Ideology after 
Crimea” (Kolesnikov, 2015), where he expressed his distinctive opinion:  
 
Following the annexation of Crimea in March 2014, the Russian public 
has embraced an increasingly conservative and nationalistic ideology. . . . 
The new ideology is based on a deliberate recycling of archaic forms of 
mass consciousness, a phenomenon that can be termed the sanctification 
of unfreedom. Confined to a besieged fortress, surrounded by external 
enemies, and faced with a domestic fifth column, the people of Russia 
have begun to experience Stockholm syndrome and have thrown their 
support behind the commander of the fortress, President Vladimir Putin. . 
. . This sacralization of unfreedom gives birth to militarism.  
 
In this long citation there are only two words which are supported by evidence: 
“conservative and nationalistic.” The rest of the judgements–especially the 
existence of the “Stockholm syndrome” and the “sacralization of unfreedom”–are 
groundless assessments. 
Conservatism (in both meanings–as a system of moral values, and as a 
political ideology) definitely dominates in Russia today. In 2016, among 75 
registered political parties (Spisok, 2016) about 20 directly declared conservative 
values and principles. At least another 15, according to their program rhetoric, can 
be named “near-conservative.” Two of the four parties represented in the Duma 
openly declare their adherence to conservatism (United Russia) and nationalism 
(the Liberal-Democratic Party). A third party in the Duma–the Communist Party 
of Russian Federation–also appeals to historical traditions and cultural roots–the 
views that are the main definition of all kinds of conservative thoughts. The 
ideological credo of the Russian President is expressed by the notion 
“conservatism.” A favorite concept of Premier Dmitry Medvedev is “conservative 
modernization” (Shirinyants, 2014). To paraphrase Russian philosopher 
Konstantin Leontiev, one can say that being a severest conservative in Russia 
today is profitable and easy like it was in the 1990s to be a liberal (Leontiev, 
1885). 
“Conservative-preservative” thinking, which shapes current Russian foreign 
policy, did not appear after Crimea. Practically all experts conclude that it is a 
product of the shaping of several hundred years. However, there is not enough 
attention to the role of the more recent period of Russian history–the 1990s. There 
is no doubt that the current way of thinking in Russia emanates from the top. 
Nevertheless, a most important and interesting consideration is not this 
circumstance, but why there is such a strong request for it from the bottom. Why 
are Russians ready to sacrifice their well-being to support President Putin’s 
politics, in particular his anti-Western and anti-American course? 
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Examining the First Post-Cold War Decade 
 
The answer to why Putin is supported by the Russian people is found by 
examining the first post-Cold War decade following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the disastrous consequences for the people of Russia. A frame for this 
ill-fated period of time is the negative attitude within the country to what was 
perceived widely as the “de-ideologization” and “Westernization” of Yeltsin’s 
domestic and foreign policies. 
Of course the “de-ideologization” of Yeltsin’s foreign policy is only a myth. 
The ideological credo of Yeltsin’s first foreign minister, A. Kozyrev, was 
expressed very clearly: “Our choice is . . . to progress according to generally 
accepted rules. They were invented by the West, and I’m a Westernizer in this 
respect–the West is rich and we need to be friends with it. . . .” (Stent, 2014, 
p. 24). Throughout the 1990s Washington’s policy toward Russia was 
conducted out of a traditional conviction that the internal socio-political 
regime shapes the international behavior of a country. In the view of 
American experts, Yeltsin was a guarantor of liberal and democratic reforms 
in Russia, and of not returning to some kind of totalitarian or authoritarian 
regime that could jeopardize U.S. interests. So the West had to support it 
financially. Money was given in the format of “structural adaptation”: Russia 
had to provide the conditions for democratization of its internal life, and to 
follow the rules that were dictated by the single “superpower”–the United 
States–in its foreign policy. Throughout the first half of the decade Russia was 
obedient, accepting the status of America’s junior partner and subsequent 
moves towards NATO expansion, cooperating with NATO in the Balkans, and 
listening to Western criticism of the Chechen war. 
Yeltsin's American honeymoon did not last long. Вy the middle of 1990s, 
many Russian people already perceived that Yeltsin's domestic and foreign 
policies were a betrayal of the national interest. At the beginning of 1996 
Yeltsin's popularity was at a historical low point, with only an 8 percent 
approval rating. He was in fifth place among presidential candidates, while the 
Communist Party leader G. Zyuganov was ahead with 21 percent. It compelled 
new Russian oligarchs, scared about the looming prospect of a communist 
victory, to join together their financial resources in order to re-elect the 
incumbent President (so called semibankirshcina–seven bankers). Still, 
Yeltsin’s victory would not have been possible without American support. In 
February of 1996 the International Monetary Fund, urged on by the United 
States, granted a $10.2 billion loan to Russia (Russia and I.M.F., 1996). These 
huge sums not only allowed Yeltsin’s team to pay off long-owed wages and 
pensions to millions of Russians shortly before the June election, but also 
deploy a massive “black arts” campaign against Zuganov. American political 
technologists played an important role in the re-election.  
Yeltsin’s victory, however, did not change public assessment. The period 
of 1996-1999 was characterized by growing domestic criticism of Russia’s 
weak and defeatist foreign policy and leading to the more nationalistic mood. 
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In 1990s, listening to endless speeches about democracy, freedom, etc., and in 
reality observing misery, crime, cheating, major corruption, and the aggression of 
a cheap mass culture, Russians realized that notorious “common human values” 
do not mean much in the absence of “freedom from need” and “freedom from 
fear.” In this time frame several generations of Russians, including very young 
people, got a very strong vaccination against the liberal system of values, Western 
ideology, and Western culture. The “syndrome of the 1990s,” which created a 
fertile soil for the growth of conservative ideology, did not mean disease. On the 
contrary, for many Russians, it meant recovering. 
The first bright manifestation of this “recovering” related to the U.S.-Russian 
interactions was the famous “Primakov loop” in March of 1999. Russia’s new 
Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov was on his way to Washington, D.C. to 
negotiate with Vice-President Albert Gore the next tranche of IMF monetary aid. 
After being informed about the NATO bombardment of Yugoslavia, which was to 
commence a few hours later, Primakov ordered the government official plane to 
return to Russia. This case went down in history under the name "Primakov's 
loop". This choice of action by Primakov was not just a gesture–it was the 
beginning of a new foreign policy consensus within Russia. “Primakov loop” 
had several key messages: Russia is a partner, not a client of the West; Russia 
is in a unique position being both a European and an Asian country, and its 
national interests lie between those two worlds; Russia is a competent actor in 
a multipolar, not a unipolar world; and in foreign policy Russia values realism 
(real deals), not some abstract ideas and dogmas.  
 
Putin’s Russia and Prospects of U.S.-Russian Interactions 
 
By the time of Putin’s coming the public mood in Russia was quite different 
from what it had been a decade before. Clinton’s policy facilitated an anti-
Western and anti-American mood within Russia. Outwardly benevolent and 
friendly, it was in fact anti-Russian, especially because it supported NATO 
expansion. In the eyes of the Russian people by “expanding democracy” in 
Russia the United States actively supported the creation of a new 
socioeconomic regime of “criminalized capitalism.” In general, the experience 
gained from dealing with different American administrations brought Russians 
to the conviction that it was easier to find a common language with 
Republicans than with Democrats. Russians considered Republicans less 
dogmatic and more maneuverable. They used to be closer to the realpolitik 
concept, which is closer in turn to Russian conservatism. Republicans are 
more inclined to prefer equilibrium in world politics. Democrats are more 
exposed to the influence of ideology and strive to pursue reforms, 
transformations, and crusades.  
According to Henry Kissinger (2005), “This is why crusaders have usually 
caused more upheavals and suffering than statesmen” (para 13). During the last 
years of President Reagan’s administration, and during the presidency of George 
H. W. Bush, American policy toward Russia was generally cautious. Then 
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Democrats came to the White House and started a policy based on liberal-
democratic ideas coupled with a reformist activism. First, came Yugoslavia and 
the 1999 NATO expansion, then more active involvement in post-Soviet space–all 
this Russia at first was watching in silence, but gradually became more and more 
wary. To paraphrase Prince Gorchakov’s famous words: “Russia was not only 
concentrating. Russia was getting angry” (Glasser, 2013, para 1.). Russia was 
preparing to counter-attack. 
Putin understood this public mood very well. It corresponded with his 
own convictions. The period of Russian-American partnership that was shaped 
after 9/11 was short. Soon Putin announced his opposition to the U.S. "war on 
terror.” Russians viewed American criticism of the wars in Chechnya and 
human rights policies as an interference in its internal affairs. That 
deterioration of relations occurred because of at least two big issues: the use 
of military force to effect regime change in Iraq, and the illegitimacy of 
Western military intervention without UN sanction. At the same time, 
Americans became more and more disappointed in Russia’s lack of 
democratic reforms. Meanwhile, rising oil prices strengthened the Russian 
economy and the socio-political situation within Russia became more stable. 
The Kremlin needed Washington less and less. Moscow increasingly accused 
Washington of undermining a systemic balance, be it via NATO’s eastward 
expansion or via humanitarian intervention into countries formerly known as the 
Third World. 
In 2005 in his Second Inaugural Address, President George W. Bush 
stressed that in order to protect the American people and defeat terrorism 
America had to spread its values to other countries: “The best hope for peace in 
our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world” (Bush, 2005). The Bush 
Freedom Agenda was just another reincarnation of liberal internationalist 
ideology. Moscow perceived it as a justification for any American 
involvement in the internal affairs of other countries. In contrast to the United 
States, Russia firmly advocated the principle of noninterference. 
In 2003, and again in 2005, Washington supported “color revolutions” in 
the Russian “backyard.” Ukraine was the most sensitive for Russians. Angela 
Stent (2014) identified the magnitude of support for the “Orange Revolution” 
by referencing the fact that Ukraine had become the third largest recipient of 
U.S aid after only Israel and Egypt (p. 111). This approach inflamed U.S.-
Russian relations. The result of this ideological confrontation was Putin’s 
legendary Munich Security Conference speech of 2007. The Munich speech 
marked a new phase in Russia’s relations with the United States and the 
world, which is continuing until the present. The basic construct of Putin’s 
Munich speech was the idea of “sovereign democracy,” which refers to a 
“form of political life where political power, the authority from which power 
is derived, and decisions are taken by a diverse Russian nation for the purpose 
of gaining material welfare, freedom and fairness for all citizens, social 
groups and nationalities and for the people that formed it” (Surkov, 2006). Of 
course the key word of the construction was “sovereign,” not “democracy.”  
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There were several core ideas in the speech: neither the United States (nor 
any other nation) can teach Russia about democracy; Russia would no longer 
accept an agenda dictated in Washington; and Russia’s political system meets 
the needs and expectations of the Russian people. The concept was more than 
just an ideological response to Bush’s Freedom Agenda: it challenged the 
universality of the Western value system and proved that Russia’s ideology 
and policy choices are derived from its own unique history and are as 
legitimate as that of the United States or Europe. Strong 
“conservative/preservative” evocative appeals to ideological and political 
traditions became dominant in Russian domestic and foreign policy theoretical 




In the 19th century Uvarov’s triad did not become an official ideology. At the 
time it was not understood and rejected. It cannot be said that the creators of 
today’s Russian ideology understand it better, but it is impossible not to see them 
attempting to revive all three postulates and adjust them to current reality. As 
Uvarov denied the godlessness of the 18th century and its mockery of faith and 
church, today Russia seeks to reverse the atheism of the Soviet era as well as the 
dissoluteness and permissiveness of the liberal 1990s. According to the revived 
ideology, the authority of the state must be based on the dominant religion, and 
only by being sanctified in the beliefs of people will it be strong and legitimate. 
As Uvarov preferred constitutional monarchy over a republic form of government, 
today Russia is promoting Putin’s model of a “strong state” which is based on the 
idea of “managed democracy.” The most complicated element of the triad–
nationality–is also very relevant for today’s political tasks. Like Uvarov counter-
posed this notion to the French revolution’s fraternité (which has international 
meaning declaring that all people are brothers), modern Russian conservatism 
appeals to nationalism to oppose globalism which implies Western, primarily 
American, dominance.  
Crimea became the culmination of implementation of these concepts. In 2014 
Putin returned national pride to the Russian people. For this, most of them are 
ready to forgive him shortages of his domestic politics, the falling standard of 
living, and the deterioration of the Russian image abroad. The degree of his 
popularity in society is still high (Reitingi “Edinoy Rossii” i Putina dostigli 
maksimuma. (2017). The “Crimea consensus” is a very important factor of 
Russian political life. And it is going to stay this way in the 2018 election. 
The Crimea annexation and following Russian participation in the war in 
eastern Ukraine ultimately damaged relations between Russia and the West, in 
particular with the United States. In this period, we have been watching probably 
the most serious split between the ideological mainstreams of the two countries in 
the history of their relations: Russian “conservative/preservative” ideology versus 
American “liberal globalism.” This confrontation is being aggravated by the fact 
that the Russian internationalism of the 20th century - in all its forms – is now 
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changed to nationalism. One can say that the same trend is visible in America 
today. But it is clear that nationalism in the United States does not have fertile soil 
since it is a country of immigrants. Today’s rhetoric of nationalism may be 
considered as an ideological deviation, which will not live very long.  
Despite the divergence of ideologies Russia and America have several key 
concerns that demand cooperation. One example is fighting Islamist terrorism. At 
this time one should not overestimate President Donald Trump’s sympathies to 
Russia and his aspirations for cooperation. Even if he has such aspirations, the 
American system of checks and balances will not let him act alone. Therefore, the 
question of the future of U.S.-Russia relations may well depend upon broader 
social views of practical well-being and moral ideas, ideologies that both 
countries, at different times and with different intensity, have shared in common. 
In the longer term, it is more likely that both countries will come to see that, 
in this globalized interdependent world, there are few great problems that can be 
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